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This paper provides an analytical theory of appropriateness judgments that introduces structural dimensions in the study of social rationality of organization members. This approach helps explore the coevolution of members’ relative position in structure and normative choices in their organization. Illustration of this approach is based on the study of controversial judicial decisions and dynamics of advice networks in a courthouse where lay judges have to choose between punitive and nonpunitive awards in cases of unfair competition in business. In this case, coevolution is facilitated by an endogenous process of centralization–decentralization–recentralization of advice networks over time, and by use of a procedural “weak legal culture” that helps align and homogenize conflicting normative choices among organization members. It is suggested that this approach to social rationality helps revisit our understanding of social processes, in this case collective learning and secondary socialization in organizations and flexible labor markets.

This study stresses the importance of considering a “joint” governance of interfirm relations as an alternative to external governance (by the State) and self-governance (by the business community) of these relations. We argue that a broadly-conceived structural and organizational approach to economic institutions provides insights into this joint governance because it shows how such a system spreads the costs of control among several kinds of stakeholders. We look at how transactions between any two firms are regulated through jurisdiction by “consular” judges (i.e. judges elected through the local Chamber of Commerce) who indirectly represent other firms and industries in that market, and are therefore considered to be at the same time third parties and potential levers of influence acting on behalf of corporate interests. We study an empirical case of such joint governance: The Tribunal of Commerce of Paris (TCP). Following previous work on lateral control and leverage, we hypothesize that industries and/or companies that have a strong stake in the conflict resolution process will be more represented among the judges of this court than other industries and/or companies, and that judges who are socially active in the court that enforces this joint governance will be sought out for advice more than other judges, and thus gain influence on their peers by suggesting specific outcomes. The analyses of the composition of the bench and of the advice network data collected in this court display an influence structure that confirms these hypotheses and that is likely to affect conflict resolution between businesses. It thus characterizes joint governance of markets as a complex set of social processes worthy of economic sociologists’ attention.

The purpose of this paper is to combine insights from collective action theory and from a structural approach to contribute to a theory of control among peers. Drawing on a network study of a medium-sized Northeastern corporate law firm, I show that partners — all formally equal and locked in a cooperative situation — have developed an informal pattern of “lateral control” to help protect their common interests against free loading due to individual expressive problems. This pattern helps peers exercise early monitoring and sanctioning by providing status-based guidance for choices of “sanctioners” who exercise pressure on behalf of the firm. The analysis identifies partners who are most likely to be chosen as sanctioners, offers structural hypotheses to explain these choices, and outlines the implications of these findings for a theory of cooperation among peers.

This study aims to explain the emergence and development of the concept of “Policy Networks” as a unit of analysis in the realm of public policies and their role in formulating a comprehensive policy for health insurance. The developments that took place over the past few decades had impacted a shift in the state’s role in shaping public policies, from a sole, key actor to one among other actors, both governmental and non-governmental, working interdependently through a set of networks.

The present study adopts the social network analysis as an approach and the social policy network as a tool to analyze public policymaking. The approach suggests the presence of a number of actors and interest groups that are actively involved in public policy and decision-making. These groups may vary from a cause to another and also from time to time. This research investigates and juxtaposes a selected sample of members of the health insurance policy network in Egypt.

In light of the study findings, one can see the existence of a policy network for the comprehensive health insurance system in Egypt. The study reveals the interrelations among a number of official and non-official key actors. The network has gone through several phases; the pre-establishment phase during the early stages of policymaking; the official establishment phase during the formative stage; and finally, the network operation phase during the implementation stage. The study also concludes that the policy network has influenced the different stages of policymaking through several tools and strategies. Moreover, the roles of different actors varied within the network; international organizations were the primary influencer in the early stages of policymaking; syndicates dominated the formative stage; and the public sector played the leading role in the implementation stage.

Serious attempts were made to benefit from policy networks with a particular focus on using the strengths of each actor while establishing an official institutional framework that consolidates coordination and cooperation among the involved parties. This framework should keep pace with global changes and developments. It should also have an official meeting venue. Above all, all parties should be listened to and their demands should be considered seriously as long as they are not actualized at the expense of the public interest nor do they undermine the sovereignty of the state. The study also enhances researchers to use policy networking as a unit for analyzing public policy and their effect on these policies.

Public policymaking in Egypt can become more responsive to people’s demands and more democratic once it was made through informative and interactive policy network. This pattern of policymaking will enhance both efficient and responsive.

Practical Implications: public policy making in Egypt can become more responsive to people demands and more democratic once it was made through informative and interactive policy network. This pattern of policymaking will enhance both efficient and responsive.

In addition to its practical contributions to the field of policymaking, this research fills a gap in the literature on the theoretical level.

Legal intermediation is an emerging theoretical concept developed to grasp the importance of the process and actors who contribute to legal endogenization, in particular in the field of economic activities and work governed by various public regulations. This chapter proposes to extend the analytical category of legal intermediary to all actors who, even if they are not legal professionals, deal on a daily basis with legal categories and provisions. In order to deepen our understanding of these actors and their contribution to how organizations frame legality, this chapter investigates four examples of legal intermediaries who are not legal professionals. Based on field surveys conducted over the past 15 years in France on employment policy, industrial relations, occupational health and safety regulation, and forensic economics, I make three contributions. First, the cases show the diversity of legal intermediaries and their growing and increasingly reflexive roles in our complex economies. Second, while they are not legal professionals per se, to different degrees, these legal intermediaries assume roles similar to those of legal professionals such as legislators, judges, lawyers, inspectors, cops, and even clerks. Finally, depending on their level of legitimacy and power, I show how legal intermediaries take part in the process of legal endogenization and how they more broadly frame ordinary legality.